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This is the last in a series of articles examining
the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal
cases. This article discusses some of the hearsay
exceptions that are recognized by the Rules. These
exceptions must be applied in light of the Confrontation Clause cases; See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US
56 (1980); State v. Tims, 9 OS(2d) 136, 224 NE(2d)
348 (1967).
RULE 803: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Rule 803 specifies twenty-two hearsay exceptions. Rule 804 specifies five hearsay exceptions.
In contrast to the exceptions enumerated in Rule
804, the Rule 803 exceptions do not depend on the
unavailability of the declarant. Rules 803 and 804
must be read in conjunction with Rule 801, which
defines hearsay, and Rule 802, which excludes
hearsay evidence in the absence of an exception.
See also Rule 805 (admissibility of multiple hearsay); Rule 806 (impeachment and rehabilitation of
hearsay declarants).
Firsthand Knowledge
Several of the exceptions recognized in the
Rules specifically require firsthand knowledge on
,--the part of the declarant. E.g., Rule 803(5) & (6). For
other exceptions, firsthand knowledge is not explicitly required. Nevertheless, firsthand knowledge
is a requirement for all exceptions. This has been
the traditional view. See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1424 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 803 reads: "1.'1 a
hearsay situation, the declarant is, of cOlfrse, a
witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dis-Penses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge. It may appear from his statement or be
inferable from circumstances. See rule 602."
RULE 803(1): PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS
Rule 803(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for

present sense impressions. The rule requires: (1) a
statement describing or explaining an event or
condition, (2) about which the declarant had firsthand knowledge, (3) made at the time the declarant was perceiving the event or immediately thereafter, (4) under circumstances that do not indicate
a lack of trustworthiness.The present sense impression exception was not recognized under prior
Ohio law, although statements that fall within this
exception may have been admitted as res gestae.
The reliability of present sense impressions
rests upon the declarant's lack of time to fabricate.
In the leading case, Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,
139 Tex 1, 161 SW(2d) 474 (1942), the court held
that the statement was "sufficiently spontaneous
to save it from the suspicion of being manufactured evidence. There was no time for a calculated
statement." /d. at 6. The Advisory Committee's
Note to Federal Rule 803 states: "The underlying
theory of Exception (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation." In addition, the time requirement-''substantial contemporaneity"-eliminates any problem associated with defects in the declarant's
ability to remember the event.
This theory of admissibility differs from the
theory which underlies the excited utterance exception recognized in Rule 803(2). The reliability of
excited utterances is based upon the declarant's
lack of capacity to fabricate. This difference in
theory explains the differences between therequirements for application of the two exceptions.
For example, a startling or exciting event is
required for the excited utterance exception, but
not for present sense impression exception.
Time Requirement
The rule requires that the statement be made
"while the declarant was perceiving the event or
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condition or immediately thereafter." The statement mu~t be nearly contemporaneous with the
perception of the event. This requirement is ll}Ore
demanding than the time requirement for exc1ted
utterances. An excited utterance could be made
minutes (possibly longer) after the exciting event,
so long as the declarant is under the influence of
the exciting event at the time the statement is
made.

Startling Event Requirement
The rule requires that the statement relate to a
"startling event or condition." This requirement
follows from the theory underlying the exception-without a startling event, the declarant's
capacity to reflect and fabricate will not be suspended. In State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 215, 373
NE(2d) 1234 (1978), the Supreme Court stated the
requirement as follows: "[T]here [must be] some
occurrence startling enough to produce a nervous
excitement in thedeclarant, which was sufficient
to still his reflective faculties and thereby make
his statements and declarations the unreflective
and sincere expression of his actual impressions
and beliefs ... " /d. (syllabus, para. 1).
The declarant may be a participant in the
event-for example the victim of an assault or
rape. The declarant also may be a bystander.
Advisory Committee's Note; Fed. R. Evid. 803
("Participation by the declarant is not required.").
If the bystander-declarant is unidentified, admissibility of the statement requires close scrutiny.
The federal drafters recognized this problem.
"[W]hen declarant is an unidentified bystander, the
cases indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone as sufficient, ... a result which would
under appropriate circumstances be consistent
with the rule." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803. See also New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v.
Kovatch, 120 OS 532, 166 NE 682 (1929) (unidentified bystander's statement admitted).
Proof of the startling event may consist of extrinsic evidence of the event, including the condition of the declarant. In addition, the utterance
itself may establish the existance of a startling
event. See C. McCormick, Evidence 705 (2d ed.
1972).

Subject Matter Requirement
The rule requires that the statement describe or
explain an event or condition. This requirement
follows from the theory underlying the exception-lack of time to fabricate. Statements beyond
descriptions or explanations indicate that the
declarant has had sufficient time to think about
the event. In contrast, the subject matter of an
excited utterance is not so circumscribed-statements "relating to a startling event" are admissible. The Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule 803 states: "Permissible subject
matter of the. statement is limited under Exception
(1) to description or explanation of the event or
condition, the assumption being that spontaneity,
in the absence of a startling event, may extend no
farther. In Exception (2) [excited utterances],
however, the statement need only 'relate' to the
startling event or condition, thus affording a
broader scope of subject matter coverage."
Circumstances of Lack of Trustworthiness
In contrast to Federal Rule 803(1), the Ohio rule
explicitly permits the exclusion of a statement that
would otherwise qualify as a present sense impression if the "circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness." One of the guarantees of trustworthiness upon which the present sense impression exception is based is verification. For
example, McCormick states that "the statement
will usually have been made to a third party (the
person who subsequently testifies to it) who, ~eing
present at the time and scene of the observation,
will usually have an opportunity to observe the
situation himself and thus provide a check on
the accuracy of the declarant's statement." C.
McCormick, Evidence 710 (2d ed. 1972). But if the
witness (the third party) heard the statement but
did not perceive the event, this safeguard is not
present. The "lack of trustworthiness" clause was
intended to protect against this possibility. The
Staff Note contains the following commentary:
One of the principal elements of the circumstantial
guaranty of trustworthiness of this exception is that
the statement was made at a time and under circumstances in which the person to whom the statement
was made would be in a position to verify the statement. The provision requiring exclusion if the circumstances donot warrant a high degree of trustworthiness would justify exclusion if, for example, the
statement were made by a declarant concerning a perceived event to another by way of a G.B. radio transmission. Other circumstances other than the lack of
verification may also taint the trustworthiness of this
class of hearsay declaration.

Stress of Excitement Requirement
The rule requires that the statement have been
made "while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition." This
requirement follows from the theory underlying the
exception; unless the declarant is speaking while
under the influence of the event, his capacity to
reflect and fabricate will not be suspended. In
State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 215, 373 NE(2d) 1234
(1978), the Supreme Court stated the re~uirement.
as follows: "[T]he statement or declaration, even 1f
not strictly contemporaneous with the exciting
cause, [must b~] made before there has been time
for such a nervOus excitement to lose a domination over [the declarant's] reflective facilities, so
that such domination continued to remain sufficient to make his statements and declarations the
unreflective and sincere expression of his actual
impressions and beliefs ... " /d. (syllabus, para. 1).
Hence, statements made after a substantial time
has elapsed, may be admissible so long as the
declarant is under the influence of the exciting
event. C. McCormick, Evidence 706 (2d ed. 1972).
The statement also may be made in response to a
question. See State v. Duncan, supra; State v.
Dickerson, 51 App(2d) 255, 367 NE(2d) 927 (1977).
2
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Statements of Presently Existing State of Mind
Statements of presently existing state of mind
or emotion, including statements of "intent, plan,
motive, design, [or] mental feeling,' are admissible
under Rule 803(3). A person's state of mind is often
a consequential or material fact under the substantive law; for example, most crimes require
proof of the defendant's mental state (mens rea).
The reliability of statements of presently existing
state of mind rests on the spontaneity of the statement, which reduces the risk of conscious fabrication. See C. McCormick, Evidence 695 (2d ed.
1972).
Frequently, statements regarding the mental
state of the declarant are not hearsay because
they are not offered to prove the truth of the assertion contained in the statement. For example, an
accused's statement, "I will kill John Doe," offered
to prove intent in a homicide prosecution, is hearsay but falls within the exception of Rule 803(3).
The statement, "John Doe is the most despicable
person I know," offered to prove intent, is not
offered to prove the truth of the assertion, and is,
therefore, not hearsay. See C. McCormick,
Evidence 694 (2d ed. 1972).

Subject Matter Requirement
The rule requires that the statement "r.elate" to
a startling event. See State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d)
215, 373 NE(2d) 1234 (1978) (syllabus, para. 1);
Potter v. Baker, 162 OS 488, 124 NE(2d) 140 (1955).
This requirement is simply a refinement of the
"under the stress of the excitement" requirement
discussed previously. Statements that do not "relate" to the startling event indicate that the
declarant is no longer speaking while under the influence of the event. In Murphy Auto Parts Co. v.
Ball, 249 F(2d) 508 (DC Cir 1957), cert. denied, 355
US 932 (1958), the court explained: "[A)s soon as
the excited utterance goes beyond description of
the exciting event and deals with past facts or
with the future it may tend to take on a reflective
quality ... In other words, the very fact that the
utterance is not descriptive of the exciting event is
one of the factors which the trial court must take
into account in the evaluation of whether the statement is truly a spontaneous, impulsive expression
excited by the event." /d. at 511.
Other Requirements
The firsthand knowledge rule applies to excited
utterances. See State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d} 215, 373
N E(2d} 1234 (1978}; Potter v. Baker, 162 OS 488, 124
N E(2d} 140 (1955).
Rules relating to the competency of witnesses
(see Rule 601) have not been applied to excited
utterances. See C. McCormick, Evidence 708 (2d
ed. 1972). Most of the Ohio cases have involved
the statements of a young child. E.g., State v.
Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 215, 373 N E(2d) 1234 (1978) (6
year old child); State v. Lasecki, 90 OS 10, 106 NE
660 (1914) (4 year old child).

Statements of State of Mind Offered to Prove
Future Conduct
Statements of presently existing state of mind
are admissible under Rule 803(3) to prove that the
declarant subsequently acted in accordance with
that state of mind. For example, the accused's
statement, "I will kill John Doe," is admissible to
prove that the accused killed Doe as well as to
prove his intent to kill. The leading case is Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 US 285 (1892), where
letters in which the declarant stated that he intended to travel from Wichita to Crooked Creek
with another person (Hillman) were offered in evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court held the letters admissible: "The letters ... were competent not as
narrative of facts communicated to the writer by
others, nor yet as proof that he actually went away
from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before
the time when other evidence tended to show that
he went away, he had the intention of going, and
of going with Hillman, which made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with
Hillman than if there had been no proof of such
intention." /d. at 295-96.
A major problem with this rule involves statements offered to prove that a person other than
the declarant also engaged in the intended conduct-for example, statements of a homicide victim that the victim intended to meet the accused
on the day of the murder. The House Judiciary
Committee Report attempted to limit the rule in
this respect: "[T)he Committee intends that the
Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hillman ... so as to render
statements of intent by a declarant admissible
only to prove his future conduct, not the future
conduct of another person." H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d
Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in, [1974] U.S.

RULE 803(3): STATEMENTS OF
PRESENTLY EXISTING STATE
OF PHYSICAL CONDITION OR MIND
Rule 803(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for
statements of a declarant's "then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health) ... " The rule explicitly excludes statements "of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification,
or terms of declarant's will." Many of the prior
Ohio cases treated statements falling within this
exception as part of the vague res gestae rule.
For purposes of analysis, the rule can be divided
into four categories: (1} statements of presently
existing physical condition, (2) statements of pre3ently existing state of mind offered to prove that
3tate of mind, (3) statements of presently existing
3tate of mind offered to prove the declarant. acted
n accordance with that state of mind, and (4)
>tatements of memory or belief offered to prove
he fact remembered or believed. Categories (2)
tnd (3) are the more important ones in criminal
:ases.
3
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Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7087. See also
United States v. Jenkins, 579 F(2d) 840 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 US 967 (1978).

mony of the witness," a requirement not explicitly
stated in the federal rule. This amendment was
intended to avoid the suggestion in United States
v. Payne, 492 F(2d) 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
US 876 (197 4), that the accuracy of the record
could be established through the testimony of a
third person, even though the witness could not
recall making the statement recorded.

RULE 803(5): RECORDED RECOLLECTION

Rule 803(5) recognizes a hearsay exception for
past recollection recorded. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.
Fed. 605 (1977). The rule requires that: (1) the witness have had firsthand knowledge of a matter; (2)
the witness made or adopted a memorandum or record concerning the matter "when the matter was
fresh in his memory"; (3) the memorandum or record reflects the witness' "knowledge correctly";
and (4) the witness has "insufficient recollection to
enable him to testify fully and accurately" about
the matter recorded. The exception for past recollection recorded should be distinguished from the
practice of refreshing recollection, which does not
involve hearsay evidence and is governed by Rule
612.
The trustworthiness of records of past recollection "is found in the reliabilty inherent in a record
made while events were still fresh in mind and
accurately reflecting them." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. The rule is consistent with
prior Ohio cases. See State v. Scott, 31 OS(2d) 1,
285 NE(2d) 344 (1972); Moots v. State, 21 OS 653
(1871 ).

Insufficient Recollection
The rule requires that the witness have "insufficient recollection" of the matter contained in the
record to enable him to testify "fully and accurately" at trial. This requirement is consistent with
State v. Scott, 31 OS(2d) 1, 285 N E(2d) 344 (1972), in
which the Supreme Court required that the witness
"lack []a complete present recollection of the
event. .. " ld. (syllabus, para. 1).
The "insufficient recollection" requirement does
not relate to the accuracy of the record or memorandum. Rather, it is aimed at avoiding abuse of
the exception. "[T]he absence of the requirement,
it is believed, would encourage the use of statements carefully prepared for purposes of litigation
under the supervision of attorneys, investigators,
or claim adjustors." Advisory Committee's Note,
Fed. R. Evid. 803. See also C. McCormick,
Evidence § 302 (2d ed. 1972).
RULE 803(6): BUSINESS RECORDS

Preparation of the Record
The rule requires the record or memorandum "to
have been made or adopted [by the witness] when
the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect
[his] knowledge correctly." These requirements
relating to the preparation of the record are designed to ensure the reliability of the matters
contained in the record.
In State v. Scott, 31 OS(2d) 1, 285 N E(2d) 344
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the record had
to have been made "at or near the time of the
event." ld. (syllabus, para. 1). In contrast, the rule
requires that the record have been prepared "when
the matter was fresh in [the witness'] memory."
This formulation follows Wigmore's view. See 3 J.
Wigmore, Evidence§ 745 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
The rule provides that the record may be either
prepared or adopted by the witness so long as the
witness vouches that the record reflects his
"knowledge correctly." If the witness makes a
statement to a third person who prepares a record,
the record is admissible if the witness verified the
accuracy of the record at a time when the event
was fresh in his memory. Even if the witness did
not verify the record, the record may be admissible
if the recorder testifies that the record contains an
accurate account of the witness' statement. This
situation involves what McCormick refers to as
"cooperative records." C. McCormick Evidence 716
(2d ed. 1972) (citing Rathbun v. Brancatella, 93
N.J.L. 222, 107 A.279 (1919).
Rule 803(5) differs from its federal counterpart in
one respect. The Ohio rule requires that the accuracy of the record be established "by the testi-

Rule 803(6) recognizes a hearsay exception for
records of regularly conducted business activities.
According to the Staff Note, the rule is "in substantial conformity with RC 2317.40, the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act ... "
Rule 803(6) requires: (1) a record of an act, event,
or condition; (2) made at or near the time; (3) by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge; (4) if the record was kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity; (5) if it
was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the record; (6) as shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness or as
provided by Rule 901(8)(10); (7) unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Records of regularly conducted business activities
include memoranda, reports, records, or "data
compilation[s], in any form ... " "The expression
'data compilation' is used as broadly descriptive of
any means of storing information other than the
conventional words and figures in written or documentary form. It includes, but is by no means
limited to, electronic computer storage." Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803.
The reliability of business records "is said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by
regularity and continuity which produce habits of
precision, by actual experience of business in
relying upon them, or by a duty to make an
accurate record as part of a continuing job or
occupation." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 803. See also Weis v. Weis, 147 OS 416, 72
4
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NE(2d) 245 (1947).
The rule requires that the record be "kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity."
The rule defines a business as an "institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit."
The term business was defined broadly in the rule
to include "the records of institutions and associations like schools, churches and hospitals ... " H.R.
Rep. No. 1597, 93rd Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Gong. & Ad News 7098, 7104 (Conference Report). Personal records are not admissible under this exception.
The rule also requires that the record be the
product of "the regular practice of that business
activity." See RC 2317.40 (record made "in the regular course of business"); Kalna v. Fialko, 102 App
442, 446, 125 NE(2d) 565, 567 (1955) ("piece of
paper was not a part of any system of the plaintiff
in recording events of his business.").

itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail. An illustration is the
police report incorporating information obtained from
a bystander: the officer qualifies as acting in the
regular course but the informant does not. The
leading case, Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E.
517 (1930), held that a report thus prepared was inadmissible .... The rule follows this lead in requiring an
informant with knowledge acting in the course of the
regularly conducted activity." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803.

If the supplier is not under a duty to transmit the
information, the record may nevertheless be admissible, but only if the supplier's statement falls
within another hearsay exception. This situation
presents a double hearsay problem and admissibility is governed by Rule 805. For example, if the
statement by the supplier is made for the purpose
of medical diagnosis or treatment, the statement
may qualify under Rule 803(4). If the supplier is not
acting pursuant to a business duty and his statement does not fit into another exception, the statement is inadmissible. See Schmitt v. Doehler Die
Casting Co., 143 OS 421,"44 NE(2d) 644 (1944);
Hytha v. Schwendeman, 40 App(2d) 478, 484, 320
NE(2d) 312, 317 (1974) ("'hearsay on hearsay,' in
the absence of other exceptions to the general
hearsay rule, is not admissible, even in view of the
business records as evidence statute.").
Method of Proof
The rule provides that the foundation for the admissibility of business records may be "shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness or as provided by Rule 901(8)(10) ... " The
reference to Rule 901(8)(1)(10), which governs
methods of authentication, does not appear in the
federal rule. According to the Staff Note, "[t]his
language was added to clearly permit the admission of records which qualify as self-authenticating pursuant to statute such as hospital records
under RC 2317.422."

Time Requirement
The rule requires that the record have been
"made at or near the time" of the act, event, or
condition. RC 2317.40 contains an identical provision. The time requirement is one of the conditions
that ensures the reliability of business records.
McCormick advocated a flexible approach in applying this requirement: "Whether an entry made subsequent to the transaction has been made within a
sufficient time to render it within the exception
depends upon whether the time span between the
transaction and the entry was so great as to suggest a danger of inaccuracy by lapse of memory."
C. McCormick, Evidence 724 (2d ed. 1972). See also
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1526 (Chadbourn rev.
1974).
Firsthand Knowledge; Double Hearsay
The rule provides that the record must have
been made by a person with knowledge of the act,
event, or condition or from information transmitted
by a person with such knowledge. This provision
does not require that the "person with knowledge"
be produced or identified.
The firsthand knowledge requirement presents
no problem when the person making the record
had personal knowledge of the act, event, or condition. The difficult cases involve records in which
the supplier of information does not make the
record, but transmits the information to another
person who makes the record. If both the supplier
and recorder are acting in the regular course of
business the record is admissible; the supplier is
under a duty to transmit the information and the
recorder is under a duty to make the record. The
recorder need not have firsthand knowledge of the
event. See C. McCormick, Evidence 726 (2d ed.
1972).
The situation is different if the supplier is not
under a duty to transmit the information.

Lack of Trustworthiness
A record that satisfies the requirements of Rule
803(6) may nevertheless be excluded if "the source
of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." The
leading case is Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 US 109
(1943), in which the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
the federal business records statute as excluding
an accident report prepared by an employee of the
defendant-railroad company. The report was excluded not because it was untrustworthy, but
rather because it was not made "in the regular
course of business." According to the Court, the
primary use of the report was "in litigating, not in
railroading." /d. at 113-14. Palmer v. Hoffman has
been criticized, see C. McCormick, Evidence 723
(2d ed. 1972), and the federal drafters decided to
deal explicitly with the problem of unreliable
records by including the "lack of trustworthiness"
requirement.
RC 2317.40 contains a similar provision-admission of the record is proper "if, in the opinion of
the court, the sources of information, method, and
time of preparation were such as to justify [the

If ... the supplier of the information does not act in the
regular course, an essential link is broken; the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information

5

record's] admission." In addition, the courts have
recognized that "if it should appear that such
records have been made and kept solely for a selfserving purpose of the party offering them in
evidence, it would be the duty of a trial court to
refuse to admit them." Weis v. Weis, 147 OS 416,
426, 72 NE(2d) 245, 251 (1947).

and nonfederal offices and agencies.") The statute
also permits the use of "certified copies." Although Rule 803(8) does not address this issue,
Rule 1005 permits the use of certified copies of
public records.
Records of Activities of the Office or Agency
Rule 803(8)(a) provides for the admission of
records setting forth the "activities of the office
or agency." The Advisory Committe.e's Note to
Federal Rule 803 contains the following examples:
"Cases illustrating the admissibility of records of
the office's or agency's own activities are numerous. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United
States, 250 U.S. 123, 39 S. Ct. 407, 63 L.Ed. 889
(1919), Treasury records of miscellaneous receipts
and disbursements; Howard v. Perrin, 200 U.S. 71,
26 S. Ct. 195, 50 L.Ed. 374 (1906), General Land
Office records; Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S.
187, 16 S. Ct. 263, 40 L.Ed. 388 (1895), Pension
Office records." The Ohio cases include: State v.
Walker, 53 OS(2d) 192, 374 NE(2d) 132 (1978)
(record of proper calibration of breath analysis
machine admitted); State v. Smith, 55 App(2d) 202,
380 NE(2d) 353 (1977) (record of notice of suspension of driver's license admitted).

RULE 803(8): PUBLIC RECORDS
Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay exception for
public records and reports. Authentication of
public records is governed by Rules 901(B)(7), (10),
and 902. Under Rule 902 many public records are
self-authenticating and thus admissible without
any need to produce an authenticating witness. If
a public record contains a statement which is
itself hearsay, admissibility is governed by Rule
805 (multiple hearsay). See also Westinghouse
Elec. v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp, 42
OS(2d) 122, 326 NE(2d) 651 (1975).
Rule 803(8) provides that records of a public
office or agency setting forth "(a) the activities of
the office or agency, or (b) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which there was
a duty to report" are admissible. There are two
limitations. In criminal cases, records containing
matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel are inadmissible if offered
by the prosecution. Moreover, if the "sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack
of trustworthiness" the record is inadmissible.
Federal Rule 803(8) contains an additional subdivision which provides: "(c) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law"
are admissible. This provision was not adopted.
Consequently, evaluative reports are not admissible under Ohio Rule 803(8). Although subdivision
(a) does not explicitly contain a firsthand knowledge requirement, that requirement is applicable.
The rule is similar to RC 2317.42, which provides: "Official reports made by officers of this
state, or certified copies of the same, on a matter
within the scope of their duty as defined by statute, shall, insofar as relevant, be admitted as evidence of the matters stated therein." There are
several differences between the rule and statute.
The statute uses the term "official reports," whereas the rule uses the phrase "[r]ecords, reports,
statements, or data compilations, in any form."
The term "data compilation" refers to computergenerated records. In addition, the statute covers
only official reports "made by officers of this
state." See State v. Colvin, 19 OS(2d) 86, 249
NE(2d) 784 (1969); Masseo v. Board of Liquor
Control, 73 Abs 94, 136 NE(2d) 663 (App 1955). In
contrast, the rule refers to records of "public
officers and agencies." This language is intended
to encompass the records of federal agencies as
well as the records of agencies of other states.
See Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803
("The rule makes no distinction between federal

Matters Observed Pursuant to
Duty Imposed by Law
Rule 803(8)(b) provides for the admission of
records setting forth "matters observed pursuant
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel, unless offered
by defendant." The Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule 803 contains the following examples:
Cases sustaining admissibility of records of matters
observed are also numerous. United States v. Van
Hook, 284 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1960), remanded for resentencing, 365 U.S. 609, 81 S. Ct. 823, 5 L.Ed. 821, letter
from induction officer to District Attorney, pursuant to
army regulations, stating fact and circumstances of
refusal to be inducted; T'Kach v. United States, 242
F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1857), affidavit of White House personnel officer that search of records showed no employment of accused, charged with fraudulently representing himself as an envoy of the President;
Minnehaha County v Kelley, 150 F.2d 356 (8th Cir.
1945); Weather Bureau records of rainfall; United
States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S. Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459, map
prepared by government engineer from information
furnished by men working under his supervision.

The Ohio cases include: Westinghouse Elec. v.
Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp, 42 OS(2d)
122, 326 N E(2d) 651 (1975) (fire department report
admissible but statements of third persons contained in report inadmissible); Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 OS 104, 100 NE(2d) 197 (1951)
(coroner's report admissible but opinion as to
suicide inadmissible).
The exclusion of police reports in criminal cases
is based on the concern that admissibility of these
reports would impinge upon an accused's right of
confrontation. In contrast to the federal rule, Rule
6

803(8)(b) includes the phrase "unless offered by
defendant." According to the Staff Note, "[s]uch
exculpatory reports should be available to the defendant since none of the constitutional hazards of
confrontation are involved in making such reports
admissible on behalf of defendants." See also
United States v. Smith, 521 F(2d) 957 (DC Cir. 1975).
If a record is excluded because it involves a matter
observed by police officers or other law enforcement personnel, the question remains whether the
record may be admitted under the business records exception, Rule 803(6). In United States v.
Oates, 560 F(2d) 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the court answered the question in the negative. Other courts,
however, have reached the opposite result. See 4
D. Louise! & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 770-76
(1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence , 803(8)[04] (1979).

ant at trial. /d. at 725. See also Ohio v. Roberts,
448 u.s. 56 (1980).
By adopting a uniform rule of unavailability that
applies to all the exceptions recognized in subdivision (B), the rule differs from the common law,
under which each exception had developed its own
conditions of unavailability. For example, the
common law unavailability requirements for former
testimony, dying declarations, and declarations
against interest were not identical.
It is the unavailability of the declarant's
testimony, rather than the unavailability of the
declarant, that is determinative. Thus, if the declarant is present in court but claims a valid
privilege, refuses to testify, or suffers a lack of
memory, his testimony is unavailable and the hearsay statements falling within the enumerated exceptions of subdivision (B) are admissible. The
burden of establishing unavailability rests on the
party offering the evidence. See State v. Smith, 58
OS(2d) 344, 390 NE(2d) 778 (1979), vacated on other
grounds, 100 S. Ct. 3041 (1980); New York Central
R.R. v. Stevens, 126 OS 395, 185 NE 542 (1933).

RULE 803(21): JUDGMENT
OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION
Rule 803(21) recognizes a hearsay exception for
judgments of previous criminal convictions when
offered "to prove any fact essential to sustain the
judgment." The rule contains an expr_ess limit~tion
to admissibility of evidence of a prevrous convrction offered by the prosecution in a criminal case;
judgments "against persons other than the accused" are not admissible except for the purpose
of impeachment. As explained by the federal
drafters, this limitation is based on constitutional
concerns:

RULE 804(8)(1): FORMER TESTIMONY
Rule 804(B)(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for
former testimony. The rule provides for admissibility (1) of the testimony of a witness at an?ther
hearing or deposition; (2) if the party agamst whom
the testimony is offered had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony of the witness by direct, cross, or redirect examination; and
(3) the witness is unavailable, Rule 804(A). The former testimony of a party is admissible against that
party as an admission of a party-opponent. See
Rule 801(D)(2)(a). Rule 804 (B)(1) supersedes
RC2945.49.
Type of Testimony
The rule provides for the admissibility of testimony given "at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding." As originally adopted, Rule
804(B)(1) excluded preliminary hearing testimony
from the former testimony exception. See 53 Ohio
Bar 220 (1980). The exclusion of preliminary
hearing testimony, Grim. R. 5(B), was based upon
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Roberts, 55 OS(2d) 191, 378 NE(2d) 492 (1978). The
Court in Roberts held that admitting preliminary
hearing testimony in a criminal trial violated the
accused's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
Several days before the Rules of Evidence became
effective, the Roberts decision was reversed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56
(1980). In response, the rule was amended by deleting the clause which exempted preliminary
hearing testimony. See 54 Ohio Bar 175-76 (1981).
The deletion of this clause means that preliminary
hearing testimony is admissible under the former
testimony exception. It should be noted, however,
that admitting preliminary hearing testimony in a
criminal trial still raises confrontation issues.

[1]he exception does not include evidence of the conviction of a third person, offered against the accused
in a criminal prosecution to prove any fact essential
to sustain the judgment of conviction. A contrary
position would seem clearly to violate the right of confrontation. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 19 S. Ct.
574, 43 L. Ed. 890 (1899), error to convict of possessing stolen postage stamps with the only evidence of
theft being the record of conviction of the thieves. The
situation is to be distinguished from cases in which
conviction of another person is an element of. the
crime, e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 902(d), interstate shipment ?~
firearms to a known convicted felon, and, as specrfrcally provided, from impeachment. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803.

rhis limitation does not preclude an accused from
ntroducing judgments against third persons.
RULE 804(A): UNAVAILABILITY
Rule 804(A) contains five conditions of unavaila>ility. A witness is unavailable where the witness
1) claims a valid privilege; (2) refuses to testify
lespite a court order to do so; (3) lacks a present
nemory of the subject matter; (4) is dead or infirm;
1r (5) is absent from the hearing and his testimony
annot be procured by process or other reasonable
1eans. Rule 804(A) must be read in light of the
:onfrontation Clause cases. In Barber v. Page, 390
I.S. 719 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
1e unavailability requirement is satisfied only if
the prosecutorial authorities have made a goodlith effort to obtain" the presence of the declar7

il

method of proof only if a transcript is not available. The court has the authority pursuant to Rule
611(A) to require a transcript be used if one is
available.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that admitting the preliminary hearing testimony in Ohio v.
Roberts was not error, the Court did not hold that
the admission of preliminary hearing testimony
will always be beyond constitutional attack. Hence
the inclusion of preliminary hearing testimony
within the former testimony exception changes the
evidentiary, but not the constitutional, analysis.
In addition to depositions and preliminary
hearing testimony, former testimony includes testimony given at a prior trial. See Sheets v. Hodges,
142 OS 559, 53 NE(2d) 804 (1944); Summons v.
State, 5 OS 325 (1856). It also includes testimony
given at any proceeding at which a witness testifies under oath.

RULE 804(8)(2): DYING DECLARATIONS
Rule 804(8)(2) recognizes a hearsay exception for
dying declarations. The rule requires that: (1) the
statement be made while the declarant believed
his death was imminent; (2) the statement concern
the "cause or circumstances of what [the declarant] believed to be his impending death"; (3) the
declarant be unavailable, see Rule 804(A); and (4)
the statement was based on the firsthand knowledge of the declarant. See Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 804 ("continuation of a requirement of firsthand knowledge is assured by Rule
602").
The rule is identical to Federal Rule 804(b)(2) and
changes prior to Ohio law. In contrast to the common law, admissibility is not conditioned on the
declarant's death. Any of the conditions of unavailability specified in Rule 804(A) is sufficient.

Similar Motive to Examine
The rule provides that former testimony is admissible only "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination." The rule does not
require "identity of parties." See C. McCormick,
Evidence § 256 (2d ed. 1972). As long as the party
against whom the former testimony is offered had
an opportunity to examine the witness at the former hearing, the rule is satisfied. It should be
noted that the rule requires only that the "opportunity" to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect E)Xamination have been provided at the
former hearing. "Actual cross-examination, of
course, is not essential, if the opportunity was
afforded and waived." C. McCormick, Evidence 616
(2d ed. 1972). See also 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §
1371 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).

Imminent Expectation of Death
The rule provides that the statement must be
"made by a declarant while believing that his
death was imminent." This requirement follows
from the theory underlying the exception; a declarant who does not believe that death is near may
not feel compelled to speak truthfully. In Shepard
v. United States, 290 US 96 (1933), Justice Cardozo
described this requirement in the following terms:
To make out a dying declaration the declarant must
have spoken without hope of recovery and in the
shadow of impending death ....
1

Method of Proof
The rule does not specify acceptable methods of
proving former testimony. RC 2945.49 contains the
following provisions on the method of proof in
criminal cases: "If such former testimony is contained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated
transcript of such testimony, it shall be proven by
the bill of exceptions, or transcript, otherwise by
other testimony."
A transcript of the former proceeding is the typical and preferable method of proof. See Rule
803(8) (hearsay exception for public records). Former testimony also may be proved by the testimony of a witness who was present at the time the
testimony was given. See Wagers v Dickey, 17
Ohio 439 (1848). In Summons v. State, 5 OS 325
(1856), the Supreme Court outlined the following
requirements:
It is essential to the competency of the witness called
to give this kind of evidence, first, that he heard the
deceased person testify on the former trial; and
second, that he has such accurate recollection of the
matter stated, that he will, on his oath, assume or
undertake to narrate in substance, the matter sworn
to by the deceased person, in all its material parts, or
that part thereof which he may be called on to prove.
/d. (syllabus).

There must be 'a settled hopeless expectation' ...
that death is near at hand, and what is said must
have been so spoken in the hush of its impending
presence .... What is decisive is the state of mind.
Even so, the state of mind must be exhibited in the
evidence, and not left to conjecture. The [declarant]
must have spoken with the consciousness of a swift
and certain doom. /d. at 99-100.

See also State v. Kindle, 47 OS 358, 24 NE 485
(1890) (statement of declarant "made in extremis,
while conscious of his condition and under a
sense of impending dissolution").
The declarant's belief of impending death may
be established by the declarant's own statements.
In addition, it may be established "circumstantially
by the apparent fatal quality of the wound, by the
statements made to the declarant by the doctor or
by others that his condition is hopeless, and by
other circumstances." C. McCormick, Evidence 681
(2d ed. 1972). See a/so State v. Kotowicz, 55 App
497, 9 NE(2d) 1003 (1937); Shinkman v. State, 7 Abs
518 (App 1029).
Nature of the Statement
The rule limits the type of statements that are
admissible under this exception to those "concerning the cause and circumstances of what [the

See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 260 (2d ed. 1972).
The testimony of a witness should be used as a
8

to the Ohio rule, Federal Rule 804(b)(3) requires
corroboration only when the statement is offered
to exculpate the accused. The corroboration requirement was explained by the federal drafters as
follows:

declarant] believed to be his impending death."
Statements identifying the assailant who caused
the injury are included, as are statements describing the events leading up to the injury. See C.
McCormick, Evidence 682-83 (2d ed. 1972); 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1434, at 282 (Chadbourn rev.
1974) ("facts leading up to or causing or attending
the injurious act.").

The refusal of the common law to concede the
adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefensible in logic, ... but one senses in the decisions a
distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons
offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either of the fact of the making of
the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either
instance by the required unavailability of the declarant. Nevertheless, an increasing amount of decisional
law recognizes exposure to punishment for crime as a
sufficient stake .... The requirement of corroboration is
included. in the rule in order to effect an accommodation between these competing considerations .... The
requirement of corroboration should be construed in
such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed.
R. Evid. 804.

RULE 804(8)(3): STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST
Rule 804(8)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for
statements against interest. See Annat., 34 A.L.R.
Fed. 412 (1977). Such statements are admissible if
(1) they are based on firsthand knowledge, (2) they
are against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest or would subject him to criminal or civil
liability or render invalid a claim by him against
another at the time made, and (3) the declarant is
unavailable, see Rule 804(A). Statements of parties
are admissible as admissions of party-opponents
under Rule 801 (0)(2).
The declaration against interest exception
has been the subject of constitutional attack. In
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284 (1973), the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusion of declarations against penal interest offered by a criminal defendant for the purpose of exculpation was
a violation of due process. See also Green v.
Georgia, 442 US 95 (1979). It should be noted
that the declarant in Chambers was not available.
Thus, in criminal cases the applicability of Rule
304(8)(3) is affected by constitutional consider:J.tions. See generally 4 D. louisell & C. Mueller,
=ederal Evidence § 489 (1980).

The Ohio rule also requires corroboration of
statements inculpating the accused-for example,
a statement by an accomplice that he and the accused committed a crime. The corroboration requirement was added because such statements
are often self-serving and their admission raises
confrontation issues. Although Federal Rule 804,
as adopted, allows the introduction of statements
inculpating the accused, the Advisory Committee's
Note to the rule recognized that such statements
may not always be reliable: "Whether a statement
is in fact against interest must be determined from
the circumstances of each case. Thus a statement
admitting guilt and implicating another person,
made while in custody, may well be motivated by a
desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence
fail to qualify as against interest. ... On the other
hand, the same words spoken under different circumstances, e.g. to an acquaintance, would have
no difficulty in qualifying. The rule does not
purport to deal with questions of the right of
confrontation."

~orroboration

Requirement
The rule provides that a "statement tending to
~xpose the declarant to criminal liability, whether
>ffered to exculpate or inculpate the accused, is
1ot admissible unless corroborating circum;tances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
;tatement." The use of the word "accused" indi:ates that the corroboration requirement was inended to apply only in criminal cases. In contrast
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